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Abstract 
In this response we first show that Simpson’s proposed analysis answers a different and less 
interesting question than ours. We then justify the choice of prior for our Bayes factors 
calculations, but also demonstrate that the substantive conclusions of our article are not 
substantially affected by varying this choice. 
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The value of consensus priors: A response to Simpson 
 
In our article ‘Rigorous Large-Scale Educational RCTs Are Uninformative: Should 
We Be Concerned?’ we demonstrated that a surprisingly large number of educational trials 
are uninformative. Simpson makes two criticisms of our article. First, he suggests that we 
should have used a subjective Bayes approach to setting priors by defining our alternative 
hypotheses based on the personal beliefs of trial designers. Second, he argues that our 
primary analysis relies upon too narrow a range of plausible effect sizes, and that therefore 
we should have used a more diffuse prior. We disagree on both counts. 
Simpson’s comment focuses on our use of Bayes factors, rather than any of the 
frequentist analyses we reported. Bayes factors compare two competing hypotheses: typically 
a null hypothesis of no effect and an alternative hypothesis which asserts that the true effect 
size is from some prior distribution. Because Bayes factors are inherently comparative, it is 
important that readers are interested in the two hypotheses being compared. So the choice of 
prior distribution for the alternative hypothesis is important.  
There are two broad philosophical approaches to choosing priors in Bayesian statistics 
(e.g., Baguley, 2012; Berger, 2006; Spiegelhalter & Rice, 2009). The so-called subjective 
Bayes approach, which is apparently strongly favored by Simpson, views the selection of 
priors as a matter of capturing the beliefs of an individual, usually the researcher conducting 
the study, about the probable outcomes of the study. In contrast, the objective Bayes 
approach involves selecting priors that capture the range of plausible effects that are likely to 
be endorsed by researchers not directly involved in the study, and which “apply over a wide 
range of contexts and domains” (Baguley, 2012, p. 396). In our analysis we adopted a 
broadly objective approach by using a similar prior to those default priors widely used in 
psychological research and implemented in software packages such as JASP (e.g., de Vries 
and Morey, 2013; Rouder, Speckman, Sun & Morey, 2009; Wagenmakers et al., 2018a, 
2018b). 
While we would not dismiss the subjective Bayes approach favored by Simpson, it 
answers a different, and in our view less interesting, question. If you believe the primary 
purpose of rigorous large-scale educational RCTs is to calibrate the personal beliefs of the 
researcher who conducted the trial, then Simpson’s proposal is the more appropriate analysis. 
It would allow such researchers to draw the conclusion described by Morey, Wagenmakers 
and Rouder (2016) as “if you were me, you would believe this” (p. 17). If instead, like us, 
you believe that rigorous large-scale educational trials should be of interest to the wider 
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research community, then priors should be based on the beliefs of that wider community. 
Morey et al. (2016) directly critiqued the position favored by Simpson by saying that “In the 
context of a scientific argument it is much more useful to have priors that approximate what a 
reasonable, but somewhat removed researcher would have in the situation.” (p. 18). They 
referred to this flavor of the objective Bayes approach as using ‘consensus priors’.  
But does the specific consensus prior we used in our primary analysis, a half normal 
distribution centered at 0 with a standard deviation of 0.2, HN(0,0.2), actually approximate 
what a reasonable, but somewhat removed, researcher would believe? Recall that this prior 
suggests that effect sizes found in rigorous large-scale RCTs that test effective interventions 
will mostly fall between 0 and 0.4, with effects below 0.2 around twice as likely as effects 
above 0.2. Simpson argues that, because Hattie’s (2009) “hinge point” is 0.4, we should have 
used a prior that captures a wider range of plausible effects. He further suggests that we 
reached our HN(0, 0.2) prior by adjusting Hattie’s figure from 0.4 to 0.2 to account for our 
“own view of the literature’s effect size inflation”. This is incorrect. Because Hattie’s 
estimate includes a combination of randomized, non-randomized, and correlational studies, it 
does not provide useful information about the range of effects we might expect in rigorous 
large-scale RCTs. Instead, as stated in our article, we based our prior of HN(0,0.2) on 
Cheung and Slavin’s (2016) analysis of how different study characteristics influence effect 
sizes. The mean effect size of the randomized studies in their sample was 0.16, although they 
noted that smaller effects than this might be expected in studies with large samples and 
distant independent measures (features present in the Education Endowment Foundation 
(EEF) and National Center for Educational Evaluation and Regional Assistance (NCEE) 
trials we studied). Because Cheung and Slavin’s estimate includes both studies that tested 
effective interventions and those that tested ineffective interventions (i.e. it mixed true nulls 
and true alternatives), and because our prior needed to only capture a plausible range of 
effects associated with effective interventions (i.e. we were modeling the alternative 
hypothesis), we felt, and still feel, that HN(0,0.2) was a reasonable choice.  
However, because other researchers might disagree, we also conducted a robustness 
check. In other words, we repeated our analysis with a variety of different priors, and 
included the findings in the supplemental materials to the original paper. An expanded 
version of this robustness check analysis is given in Table 1. 
If you believe that most researchers are as optimistic as Simpson, in the sense that 
they believe that EEF/NCEE-style RCTs which test effective interventions will find 
standardized effect sizes larger than 0.4 a third of the time, then you will be most interested in 
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the HN(0, 0.4) line of Table 1. If you agree with us, and believe that most would think that 
effects larger than 0.4 are very unlikely in these kinds of trials, then you will be more 
interested in the analysis we conducted (shown in row HN(0, 0.2)). 
However, crucially Table 1 reveals that our substantive conclusion is not dramatically 
altered regardless of which prior you favor. In every case, a surprisingly large proportion of 
the EEF and NCEE trials in our sample are uninformative (in the sense that they have Bayes 
factors between 3 and 1/3). We believe this should concern the educational research 
community. 
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Table 1 
The percentage of trials in our sample that were uninformative (had Bayes factors between 3 
and 1/3), that favored the null, H0 (had Bayes factors below 1/3), and that favored the 
alternative, Ha (had Bayes factors above 3), under various different priors for the alternative 
hypothesis.  
 
Ha Prior Mean Ha Prior SD % uninformative % favoring H0 % favoring Ha 
Half Normal Priors, HN(0, SD) 
0 0.2 40 38 23 
0 0.3 35 45 20 
0 0.4 29 52 18 
0 0.5 28 56 16 
Normal Priors, N(0, SD) 
0 0.2 57 27 16 
0 0.3 43 43 14 
0 0.4 38 51 11 
0 0.5 33 57 10 
Normal Priors, N(0.2, SD) 
0.2 0.1 29 49 22 
0.2 0.2 38 45 18 
0.2 0.3 37 48 15 
0.2 0.4 30 55 14 
 
